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STATE OF UTAH 
DeWITT DISTRIBUTORS, 
INC., a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
BOND FURNITURE, INC., dba 
VRONTIKIS FURNITURE, NICK 
VRONTIKIS and H E L E N W. 
VRONTIKIS, his wife, ST. 
NICHOLIS INVESTMENT 
COMPANY, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF T H E CASE 
This was an action instituted by Plaintiff to collect 
a promissory note, secured by a trust deed on real prop-
erty and a lien on personal property, in which the Dis-
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D I S P O S I T I O N IN T H E L O W E R COURT 
The question of the amount of costs and attorneys' 
fees to be awarded Plaintiff was heard by the District 
Court on January 25, 1974, and the Court awarded 
Plaintiff the sum of $1,834.30. 
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L 
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks to have the award of 
the District Court affirmed on appeal. 
S T A T E M E N T OF FACTS 
On December 8, 1972, Plaintiff instituted action 
against Defendants to recover the sum of $21,566.08, 
plus interest, costs and attorneys fees, evidenced by a 
promissory note and secured by a trust deed on real 
property and a lien on merchandise of the Defendants. 
(R. 42-57). Through numerous procedures during the 
following months, the Plaintiff's attorneys were able 
to collect the entire principal and interest which was 
due to the Plaintiff. These procedures included the 
obtaining of a temporary restraining order and order 
to show cause (R. 29-30); an agreement for disposal 
of the merchandise which was the subject restraining 
order and order to show cause (R. 34-39); an assign-
ment of the proceeds of a real estate contract (R. 40-
41); the obtaining of a trust deed covering additional 
real property (R. 26-28); the obtaining af assignments 
of insurance proceeds (Exhibits 3-P and 4-P); and a 
sales agreement (Exhibit 5-P). By March 20, 1973, 
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3 
the only matter remaining to be resolved was the amount 
of costs and attorneys' fees to be awarded Plaintiff in 
the action. The sum of $1,834.30 was then deposited 
with the Clerk of the Court to secure the payment of 
these costs and attorneys' fees (R. 23-24). The De-
fendants never filed an answer or responsive pleading 
to Plaintiff's complaint or to any other pleading or 
motion of Plaintiff in the action, and on June 20, 1973, 
the default of each of the Defendants was entered. 
(R. 21) 
On January 15, 1974, Plaintiff filed a motion to 
have the Court set the amount of costs and attorneys' 
fees to be awarded Plaintiff in the action (R. 12). 
Notice of this motion was given to Defendants' attor-
neys (R. 14). On January 25, 1974, Plaintiff's motion 
came on regularly for hearing before Judge Maurice 
Harding. The Plaintiff's attorney, Roger J . Mc-
Donough, was placed under oath and testified as to the 
nature and amount of work involved in the action and 
what he considered to be a reasonable attorneys' fee to 
be awarded in the action. He was then cross examined 
by Defendant's attorney, Paul Cotro-Manes. On the 
basis of the evidence so introduced the Court awarded 
Plaintiff the sum of $1,834.30 as its costs and reason-
able attorneys' fees in the action (R. 8) 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
T H E A T T O R N E Y S ' F E E S I N T H I S 
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ACTION W E R E P R O P E R L Y AWARD-
E D B A S E D UPON SWORN T E S T I -
MONY AS TO T H E AMOUNT OF A 
R E A S O N A B L E F E E TO BE A W A R D -
E D IN T H E ACTION. 
The brief of Defendant-Appellants spends con-
siderable time arguing that it is generally required that 
evidence be introduced on the question of attorneys' 
fees. Plaintiff-Respondent agrees entirely with the 
position of Defendant-Appellants in this regard, and 
agrees with the cases cited in support of this proposition. 
I t appears clear that in the State of Utah, in the absence 
of a stipulation, evidence should generally be introduced 
on the amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded. This is 
exactly what happened in the instant case. 
On January 15, 1974, the Plaintiff filed a motion 
to have the Court fix amount of costs and attorneys' 
fees to be awarded in the action. (R. 12) This was the 
only matter remaining to be resolved in the case. The 
motion came on regularly for hearing on January 25, 
1974, the Plaintiff being represented by Roger J . Me-
Donough and the Defendants being represented by Paul 
Cotro-Manes. (R. 8). Plaintiff's attorney was placed 
under oath and testified as to the nature and extent of 
the work involved in the action and gave his opinion as 
to the amount of costs and attorneys' fees which should 
be awarded. He was then cross examined by the Defen-
dant's attorney, Paul Cotro-Manes. Following this 
testimony and cross examination the matter was sub-
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mitted and the Court awarded Plaintiff the sum of 
$1,834.30. 
Nowhere in Defendant-Appellant's brief is it as-
serted that Plaintiff's attorney was not sworn, did not 
testify under oath on the matter of attorneys' fees or 
was not subjected to cross examination. The Defendant-
Appellants admit at page 2 of their brief that Plaintiff's 
attorney did testify as to the legal services performed 
in the matter. This evidence so introduced, complied 
fully with the directive of the Supreme Court as to the 
procedure to be followed in awarding attorneys' fees. 
The Defendant-Appellants appear to assert, how-
ever, that six documents which were exhibited to the 
Court during the testimony of Plaintiff's attorney were 
not formally introduced in evidence, and that therefore 
no evidence was introduced. 
The specious nature of this argument deserves 
little comment. The testimony of Plaintiff's attorney 
was introduced in evidence. This is the only type of 
evidence that is required. There never has been a doc-
trine in this state that the amount of an award for at-
torneys' fees must be established by documentary evi-
dence as opposed to sworn testimony. In fact, it is sworn 
testimony, and not documentary evidence, that is em-
ployed in almost every case to establish the amount 
of an award for attorneys' fees. 
The six documents in question which were exhibited 
to the Court during the course of the testimony were 
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merely demonstrative of the work performed by Plain-
tiff's attorney which was not shown by the record already 
on file in the action. The unchallenged pleadings them-
selves were replete with other evidence of the work per-
formed by Plaintiff's attorneys in the case. Illustrative 
of this work were the temporary restraining order and 
order to show cause (R. 29-30) ; the agreement for 
disposal of the merchandise (R. 34-39); the obtaining 
of the assignment of the proceeds of the real estate con-
tract (R. 40-41); and the obtaining of a trust deed 
covering additional real property (R. 26-28). 
The procedure which was adopted in this case in 
establishing the amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded 
is the procedure outlined in the concurring opinion of 
Justice Ellett in the recent case of Hatch v. Sugarhouse 
Finance Company, 20 U.2d 156, 434 P.2d 758 (1967). 
Plaintiff's attorney was sworn, testified as to the nature 
and extent of the work performed in the action, and 
was cross examined by Defendants attorney. The mat-
ter was then submitted to the Court and the Court ex-
ecuted an order stating that evidence was introduced 
and that Plaintiff was to be awarded the sum of 
$1,834.30 for its costs and reasonable attorneys fees 
in the action. 
P O I N T I I 
T H E F A C T T H A T NO STENOGRA-
P H I C R E P O R T OF T H E P R O C E E D -
I N G W A S M A D E OR IS A V A I L A B L E 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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D O E S NOT E N T I T L E D E F E N D A N T -
A P P E L L A N T S TO A R E V E R S A L OF 
T H E A W A R D W H E R E D E F E N -
D A N T - A P P E L L A N T S H A V E M A D E 
NO A T T E M P T TO COMPLY W I T H 
R U L E 75 (m) U T A H R U L E S O F C IVIL 
P R O C E D U R E . 
The Defendant-Appellants do not claim that the 
testimony taken in this matter was insufficient to sus-
tain the award of attorneys' fees in this case. They do 
not point out one scintilla of testimony or evidence in 
support of the proposition that some lesser or different 
award should have been made or that the award which 
was made was excessive, or was an abuse of the Trial 
Court's discretion. What the Defendant-Appellants do 
claim is that no stenographic report of the testimony 
was taken or is available. They claim, therefore, that 
it must be presumed that the testimony did not support 
the award, that the award is excessive, or that the trial 
court abused its discretion, and the award of costs and 
attorneys' fees must be reversed. I t is respectfully sub-
mitted that this is not the law. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure specifically 
contemplate that situations may arise in which no steno-
graphic report of proceedings was made, or is available. 
In such situations the case is not simply reversed or 
remanded at the request of the appellant. Such cases 
are governed by Rule 75 (m), Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, which provides as follows: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"(m) Appeals When No Stenographic 
Report Available. In the event no stenogra-
phic report of the evidence or proceedings at a 
hearing or trial was made, or is available, the 
appellant may prepare a statement of the evi-
dence or proceedings from the best available 
means, including his recollection, for use in-
stead of a stenographic transcript. This state-
ment shall be served on the respondent who 
may serve objections or propose amendments 
thereto within 10 days after service upon him. 
Thereupon the statement, with the objections 
or proposed amendments, shall be submitted to 
the district court for settlement and approval 
and as settled and approved shall be included 
by the clerk of the court in the record on ap-
peal." 
The right to prepare such a statement of the evi-
dence and proceedings pursuant to Rule 75 (m) is 
granted to the appellant. There is no similar rule grant-
ing such a right to a respondent, the respondent's sole 
right being to object to the appellant's statement and 
propose amendments thereto. 
In the instant case, if Defendant-Appellants 
thought that there was anything at all in testimony 
which indicated that the award in question was exces-
sive or that the trial court abused its discretion, the at-
torney for Defendant-Appellants could have prepared 
a statement of such testimony, based on his own recollec-
tion, and have thereby afforded the Supreme Court the 
opportunity to determine whether or not the testimony 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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was sufficient to sustain the award. This, of course, the 
Defendant-Appellants have failed to do. 
Rule 75 (m) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
is identical to Rule 10(c), Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure (formerly Rules 75 (n) Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.) This Federal Rule was construed in 
the case of Murphy v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insur-
ance Company, 314 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1963) in a situa-
tion quite similar to the one involved in the instant case. 
In the Murphy case a portion of the reporter's re-
cording discs were destroyed, and consequently, portions 
of proceedings in the trial court were not available as a 
part of the record on appeal. In the Murphy case as in 
the instant case, the appellant contended that the case 
must be remanded for a new trial because of the un-
availability of the transcript of that portion of the pro-
ceedings in which error was claimed to have occurred. 
In the Murphy case, as in the instant case, the appellant 
made no effort to supply the record through Rule 75-
(n). The appellate court refused to order a new trial 
and affirmed the decision of the trial court. The appel-
late court stated: 
" . . . I t is elementary that the burden is on the 
appellants to show error. CF. Strachan Ship-
ping Co. v. Alexander, 5 Cir., 1962, 311 F.2d 
385. 
The appellants have not availed them-
selves of the provisions of Rule 75 (n), F.R.-
C.P., a procedure which might well have 
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enabled them to bring a sufficient record be-
fore us. CF. Cadby v. Savoretti, 5 Cir. 1956, 
242 F.2d 751 and Herring v. Kennedy-Her-
ring Hardware Co., 6 Cir., 1958 261 F.2d 
202. In the absence of compliance with the 
Rules, the charges urged to be erroneous are 
not in the record and not before us. Browder 
v. United States, 5 Cir., 1961, 292 F.2d 44, 
49." 
Where evidence or proceedings in the lower court 
were not transcribed, or where the stenographic tran-
script is not available, the appellant cannot obtain a 
reversal unless he at least makes an attempt to comply 
with Rule 75 (m). The following excerpts from 9 Moore, 
Federal Practice §210.66 at pages 1629-1631 set forth 
the law in this regard: 
"The stated purpose of original Civil 
Rule 75(n), analogue of present Rule 10(c), 
was to provide 'a method whereby a record may 
be prepared in the perhaps rare case where 
there is no reporter present at all and no steno-
graphic report is made of the proceedings.' 
# # # 
'If it is necessary to add to the record 
parts of the evidence or proceedings which 
were not recorded by the reporter, the provi-
sions of Rule 10(c) must be followed. Bare 
recitals of counsel as to what transpired are 
not enough.' " 
* * * 
"Since Rule 10(c) does provide a method 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
of including in the record proceedings and 
evidence that do not appear in the reporter's 
transcript, a party may not seek a new trial 
simply on the ground that matters that occur-
red in the district court are not reflected in 
the transcript. He must at least make an 
effort to supplement the record by proceeding 
under Rule 10(c)." 
In the instant case no stenographic transcript of 
the testimony in question was apparently made or is 
available. This does not entitle appellant to a reversal 
or a new trial where he has made no attempt whatsoever 
to provide such testimony, through his attorney's best 
recollection, pursuant to Rule 75 (m). If Defendant-
Appellants in fact believe that the testimony was insuf-
ficient to sustain the award, they should supply such 
testimony as they feel will sustain their position as pro-
vided by Rule 75 (m). The Defendant-Appellants have 
the burden of establishing that the testimony taken did 
not support the award. They have failed completely to 
sustain this burden through their failure to point out 
to this Court through the use of Rule 75 (m), in what 
respects the testimony was deficient. 
P O I N T I I I 
F I N D I N G S OF FACT A N D CONCLU-
SIONS OF L A W W E R E NOT R E -
Q U I R E D I N T H E I N S T A N T CASE. 
Defendant-Appellants' final contention is that the 
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award in the instant case must be reversed because no 
findings of fact and conclusions of law were made in 
the instant case. However, the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure and the record in this case show that no findings 
of fact and conclusions of law were required. Rule 52 
(c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
"(c) Waiver of Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of law. Except in actions for 
divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of 
law may be waived by the parties to an issue 
of fact: 
(1) By default or by failing to appear 
at the trial; . . . " (Emphasis added) 
Where the defendants have failed to answer or 
otherwise plead to the Plaintiff's complaint, and their 
default has been entered, no findings of fact or conclu-
sions of law are required in order to sustain the judg-
ment or award. Such defaulting Defendants are not 
even entitled to notice of any further proceedings in the 
action. (Rule 55(a)(2) , Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure). 
In the instant case the Defendants were all served 
with summons and verified complaints on December 
8, 1972 (R. 15-20). None of the Defendants ever filed 
any answer or other adverse pleading in the action and 
on June 12, 1973, the default of all Defendants was 
entered. (R. 21) No motion was ever made to have the 
default of the Defendants set aside. Six months after 
the Defendants' default was entered, the hearing was 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
held to fix the amount of attorneys' fees in the action. 
At that time the default of the Defendants continued, 
and still continues up to the present time. Under these 
circumstances, no findings of fact or conclusions of law 
are required. 
In the instant case the defendants waived findings 
of fact and conclusions of law by their default in the 
action. A party who thus waives the making of findings 
of fact and conclusions of law cannot thereafter take 
advantage of his default, and complain that no findings 
of fact were made. In such circumstances the Supreme 
Court will not review the facts but will assume that the 
trial court found them to be such as to sustain his award. 
Farrell v. Turner, 25 U.2d 351, 482 P.2d 117 (1971); 
Mower v. McCarthy, 122 Utah 1, 245 P.2d 224 (1952). 
CONCLUSION 
In the instant case the Defendants failed to answer 
or otherwise plead to Plaintiff's verified complaint and 
their default in the action was entered. By their failure 
to answer, the Defendants admitted the allegations of 
the complaint, including their execution of the note and 
trust deed which provided for the payment of attorneys' 
fees. By their default they also waived findings of fact 
and conclusions of law and waived the right to receive 
notice of any further proceedings in the case. 
In spite of the fact that they had waived the right 
to receive notice of a hearing to fix the amount of at-
torneys' fees, notice of the hearing was given to De-
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fendants by Plaintiff. At the hearing, the Plaintiff's 
attorney was sworn and testified on the matter of at-
torneys' fees. He was then cross examined by Defen-
dants' attorney. At the conclusion of the hearing the 
matter was submitted and the Court awarded Plaintiff 
the sum of $1,834.30. 
The fact that no stenographic report of the hearing 
was made, or is available is not grounds for reversing 
the decision of the trial court. If the Defendants actually 
believe that the testimony given was insufficient to sus-
tain the award, they have the burden of establishing 
such insufficiency. Rule 75 (m) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure provides that in such circumstances, 
the Appellants must prepare a statement of the evidence 
and proceedings in lieu of the stenographic transcript. 
Such a statement supporting the alleged claim of in-
sufficiency would have been a simple document to pre-
pare. I t could have been based solely on the recollection 
of Appellants' attorney as to what took place at the 
hearing. The Appellants never attempted to prepare 
such a statement. 
The actions of the Defendant-Appellants in this 
case has been one of continuous default. They defaulted 
in making their payment of the promissory note and 
this necessitated the institution of the action. They de-
faulted in answering or otherwise pleading to the veri-
fied complaint, thereby admitting the allegations of the 
complaint, and waiving findings of fact and conclusions 
of law and notice of any further proceedings in the case. 
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They defaulted in preparing the statement of evidence 
and proceedings required by Rule 75 (m) Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, thereby failing to sustain their bur-
den of establishing that the testimony given at the hear-
ing was insufficient to support the award. The Defen-
dant-Appellants should not be permitted to harvest a 
benefit sown from the seeds of their own numerous 
defaults. 
I t is respectfully submitted that in the instant case, 
the Supreme Court must assume that the Trial Court 
found the facts to be in accordance with its award, that 
the testimony supported the award and that the decision 
of the trial court must be affirmed. 
Roger J. McDonough, of 
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